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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr dtd 11 Jun 1980

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HEADQUARTERS
ADVISORY TEAM 68 (VINH LONG PROVINCE)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

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MACDR-68

12 February 1973

SUBJECT: Province Senior Advisor
Completion of Tour Report (RCS MACCORDS 174.01)
Wallace F. Veaudry, COL, USA, 008-14-8104

AD B 001520

THRU: DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: Headquarters
US Military Assistance Command
ATTN: MACCORDS (AC of Staff, CORDS)
APO 96222



1. Attached is subject report for the period 4 Jan 1972 - 15 Feb 1973.
2. Overview.

The cease-fire agreement was effective at 280800 Jan 73. The Viet-Cong continue to violate that cease-fire and conduct the same harassments of OPs by small arms and mortar fire, attempted infiltration of hamlets, abductions, and terrorism that have been employed during the year 1972. Although the number of incidents is much lower the operations continue.

Vinh Long Province is not pacified. The D-3 Regiment, a local force battalion and local guerrillas, an estimated total of 1800 Viet Cong, are located within the province in addition to an estimated 1300 VCI. This despite the fact that over 2700 VC were killed or captured during 1972.

Two Districts, Chau Thanh and Cho Lach are completely pacified; Binh Minh and Minh Duc are relatively secure and Tam Binh, Vung Liem and Tra On are relatively insecure. It is in these last three districts where over 95% of the enemy force is located and where most of the incidents occur.

DAMO-ODU
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Inclosure 6

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MACDR-68

12 February 1973

SUBJECT: Province Senior Advisor
Completion of Tour Report (RCS MACCORDS 174.01)
Wallace F. Veaudry, COL, USA, 008-14-8104

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Despite this rather bleak picture, there are rays of sunshine. The Province Territorial forces are large enough and capable of destroying the VC forces. The police could eliminate the VCI. What is needed is improved training of junior leaders, elimination of inept leaders and a determination to do the job.

The 9th ARVN division is not the answer to Vinh Long's problems. Regional Forces are much more effective against the VC. The return of the four Vinh-Long RF Battalions from Dinh Tuong and Vinh Binh Provinces would provide the Province Chief with sufficient forces, both mobile and static, to eliminate all mini-bases and either destroy the VC or drive them from the Province, should hostilities begin again.

If peace should become a fact, the VC control only isolated, uncultivated marshes and woodlines. Their control of population is minimal, less than 05%. All major highways and canals are open to traffic and the VC will find themselves cut off from the population, living on unproductive land with none of the improvements offered to those who support the government (GVN). It is doubtful that they can maintain their strength or recruit new followers under these conditions.

Development is the bright picture in the Province. Roads are being improved, bridges constructed, school rooms and dispensaries are built, staffed and furnished. Agriculture production is increasing and farmers are enjoying new wealth which provides modern equipment, better homes and more luxuries. New homes are being constructed and new businesses opening. Banking is an indication of growth and at this time the province has three commercial and three Development banks with three more development and commercial banks due to open in a few months.

The Province capital has new sidewalks, sewer system, water distribution system and increased electrical power. A new deep water port with storage facilities promises increased business for the city and the Province. Education is growing by bounds with new classrooms, more teachers and better organization at the province level. Taxation has improved and the Province government is now self sufficient. During this year most of the sixty five villages should also be self sufficient with enough funds for continued development - thanks to the new tax decree. Villages and hamlet governments are stronger and more sustained. Although many Village Chiefs are appointed, most are an improvement over their predecessors.

The major problem areas at this time are all capable of resolution. What happens during the next few weeks or months in terms of solving the VC problem will determine whether Vinh Long takes giant steps forward or continues to

Continued
MACDR-68


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grow at a steady peace. Progress is inevitable; only a catastrophe could stop it. Specific problems and recommended solutions are listed by Program or Directorate in the Report.

I am both pleased and honored to close out the US military effort in Vinh Long. I pray that it is not too soon and that this beautiful country can grown in peace.

1 Incl
Final Counterpart Letter


WALLACE F. VEAUDRY
COL, IN
Province Senior Advisor

SECTION I

NAME: WALLACE F. VEAUDRY

GRADE: COLONEL

SSAN: 008-14-8104

BRANCH OF SERVICE: US ARMY

PROVINCE: VINH LONG

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 4 Jan 1972 - 15 FEB 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 17 Feb 1973

PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM (DATE - INCLUSIVE): July 1967 - June 1968

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAME TOUR: Division Chief
Psy OP Directorate
HQ MACV

SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

Twenty six years of varied military experience to include combat (Korea), general staff, command of Plt, Co, Bn and Brigade. Instructor at Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg in CI and Psy OP. Attendance at all levels of Service Schools and instructor at the US Army War College in courses on insurgency, counter insurgency, US National Interests and foreign policies, under developed countries, and strategic analysis.

2. What training did you have for this position?

Attended the Vietnam Training Center, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C. from 23 Aug 71 to 7 Dec 1971. This was a modified PSA course with 12 weeks of Language Training. I had previously attended and taught at the John F. Kennedy Center, FT. Bragg, courses on counterinsurgency Psy OP and unconventional warfare.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

None.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

18 months to two years.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

Satisfactory. One minor problem was due to the fact that the Technical Service Chiefs and the Deputy for Administration at Province level deal directly with Saigon. The requirement for sending advisory reports and information thru Region, in the area of civil programs, often caused delays or Province problems were lumped together with other delta provinces and forwarded to Saigon, losing some of their impact. A direct to Saigon channel with info for Region in some instances would have been more effective for the US effort.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available?

No.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Yes. However, on the development side statistics are often required when a short comment or narrative would be more revealing. These short comments could then be circulated as "feed back" to the field. One report that did this was the public administration portion of the Province Profile Update. It was helpful to advisors.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

Yes. However, reports usually request the "official" figures given by Province to Saigon. Provisions should be made for reporting actual figures, when they are available. The two figures are not always the same.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

No problem.

10. The most clearly defined directed programs are:

1. Land Reform (LTT)
2. RD Cadre
3. VSD

11. The most effective para military forces are:

1. RF
2. PF
3. PSDF

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

1. LTT (Land Reform)
2. RD Cadre
3. Territorial Forces/Local Revenue Improvement

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. Land Reform

2. Territorial Forces
3. Road Construction (Portion of Public Works)/Education.
14. The least successful pacification programs are:
 1. VIS
 2. War Victims
 3. Administrative Reform
15. The program that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
 1. Eradication of Social Evils
 2. Labor (Manpower Development)
 3. Peoples Organizations
16. The rural peoples are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making.
17. The people, as you know them, are more () committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

They are more prosperous. Despite increased GVN taxes, the improved security results in less total tax since the people do not have to pay the VC as often. Land to the Tiller has gained many strong supporters in the country-side. The VC offensive in April 72 was a flop and the people are more confident in the ARVN/GVN. Improved roads, resulting in improved communications and ease of travel, have allowed people to see the growth in the Province.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam?

Yes. Any 5 year plan must be general in nature. Only when attempts are made to quantify goals such as, number of shellings, prostitutes to be arrested, numbers of terrorist acts, does it become unrealistic. There is sufficient guidance to give direction and impetus to development. It is general enough to allow flexibility in execution.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart?

Yes.

SECTION III
TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF:

In early 1972 the RF/PF had reached a fair level of training and operational capability. Mini-base clearing operations were proceeding well and the major enemy forces, the D3 Regiment and the 857 Local Force Battalion, had been driven from the Province. Friendly initiated incidents were at least twice as high as enemy initiated incidents. Pacification was proceeding well and development projects were resulting in improved roads, bridges, school rooms and water distribution as well as agriculture development.

The NVA/VC April offensive created a shock wave in the Province. The tactical field CP was badly damaged and high casualties were sustained. Binh Minh District town received a ground attack and the district headquarters compound was penetrated for the first time. Troop morale was low and there was great concern for the country.

It wasn't until late July that Province forces regained the initiative and troop morale improved.

With a new Province Chief came new direction and aggressive operations. In early August the enemy sustained heavy losses while friendly losses were comparatively light.

By November, the organizational changes initiated in May that increased the RF/PF forces began to impact on the effectiveness of the territorial forces. Too many RF Companies and Battalions formed too rapidly by upgrading PF and Lien Doi, without the parallel increase in trained officers and NCOs, resulted in less effective operations. A Lien Doi was ambushed resulting in heavy casualties. A Battalion was ambushed on Hwy 70 resulting in the death of its Commander, and a company was ambushed while on an operation resulting in heavy friendly losses. All of these incidents resulted from violations of basic tactics - lack of flank security, single file formations, failure to maintain communications, failure to use supporting fires. By January the territorial forces had regained their initiative and were once again punishing the enemy.

During 1972 there were a total of 1282 friendly initiated incidents compared to 1051 enemy incidents. In addition there were 646 mine and booby-trap incidents. Casualties to friendly forces were 1087 KIA and 3063 WIA while the enemy sustained 2700 KIA, 205 captured and 328 rallied.

Major organizational changes during 1972 resulted in eight Lien Doi being converted to RF Battalions and 12 additional RF Companies formed by converting PF Platoons to RF. At the end of 1972 Vinh Long Province had 11 RF

Battalions, 67 RF Companies and 298 RF Platoons. Four of the Battalions were deployed outside of Province; three in Dinh Tuong and one in Vinh Binh.

In December 1972, the Headquarters, 9th ARVN Division moved into Vinh Long. This was the first time in over 1½ years that ARVN troops were employed in the Province. Two Battalions of the 16th Regiment and the Regimental Reconnaissance Company began to conduct coordinated operations with Vinh Long territorial forces in January 1973. One Battalion of the 16th Regiment operated in the Province during late December 1972.

In addition to unit conversion training, complementary and refinement training was scheduled during the year. Changing operational requirements caused the cancellation of many scheduled RF training courses. PF refresher training, however, was consistently accomplished in Province by mobile training teams. A major weakness in unit training was that officers and NCOs rarely participated with their units. Unit effectiveness would be greatly improved if leaders trained with the unit. All of them could use refresher training. One very successful training program was artillery employment and adjustment training conducted throughout the year by sector. All echelons of command down to and including outpost commanders received the training. As a result, artillery support was excellent throughout the province.

The majority of operations conducted by territorial forces were searching and clearing operations. Typically, these operations were of one day duration. When contact was made with enemy forces it was usually broken at night and friendly forces returned to base areas. Much more effective operations would have resulted had they been two or three day sustained operations. Also, fewer casualties would have resulted from mines and booby-traps if friendly forces had remained in and secured mini-base areas that they were clearing. Each time friendlies withdrew, the VC planted new mines.

Mini base clearing is the key to elimination of VC forces within the Province. Once their base areas are cleared and they are denied concealment the enemy must either attempt to move in with the populace (and thus their location identified) or they must move out to find new areas to hide in. A combination of mini-base clearing and resettlement of population in previously denied areas would make it impossible for the VC to exist within government controlled areas.

PSDF:

The goal for PSDF organization was 114,060 members. By the end of 1972 there were 113,089 PSDF members of which 36,665 had completed training. There were 31,098 hardcore members towards the goal of 32,060 and 28,390 of these had completed training. All 1540 team leaders had been trained and 15,303 weapons had been issued. In addition, the goal of 82,000 support PSDF had been reached with all having completed training.

Leadership, command emphasis and motivation were major weaknesses in the Program. Since little was expected, in most cases little other than a formal organization was accomplished. There were outstanding exceptions in some Districts where exceptional leadership and command interest resulted in high esprit and effective organization. Concentration on training in smaller groups using highly qualified and motivated instructors would improve training. More careful selection of leaders and more interest on the part of Village and District Chiefs would provide greater motivation and development of a better force. The main accomplishment in this program was that of organizing the populace and getting at least some outward commitment to the Villages, Districts and thus National Government.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE (NPFF).

The Police Field Force in Province consists of one Company of eight platoons with a total of 343 policemen. All were trained in combined operations at DaLat during the year.

During the major portion of 1972 the NPFF were generally ineffective. Although they averaged 100 combined and independent operations per month the results against the VCI were marginal. Part of the problem was due to mal-employment of the NPFF platoons by District Chiefs. They were either used as "Palace Guards" or in tactical operations, with RF/PF troops, as a blocking force. Few raids or targetted operations against the VCI were conducted. An added mission, that of rural patrols, has recently been assigned to the NPFF. However, their primary role continues to be targetted operations against the VCI.

Some difficulties occurred when the District Police Chief had to obtain clearance for targetted operations from the District Chief. In those districts where animosity of indifference existed between the police and the District Chief, operations were naturally hampered. As relationships improved, due to a combination of either new District Chiefs or new Police Chiefs and pressure from the Province Chief, better utilizations was made of the field police. Continued emphasis on proper employment and close cooperation and coordination between the police and the military/civilian authorities is needed to improve results. The targetting of VCI has been at best haphazard. Although dossiers are developed and plots of movement of VCI are made, the final step of assigning responsibility and conducting a raid or operation, based on intelligence, is often aborted for reasons that we have been unable to determine.

MARINE POLICE.

The Marine Police force is presently equipped with three 40 foot diesel powered patrol boats, six 15 foot interceptors with 75 HP outboard motors and a complement of 60 police. Results of this force have not been impressive, averaging an arrest of one smuggler a month. Most arrests involve license

violations or improper documentation. No high level VCI have been apprehended by this force.

NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS (NP).

One major success of the Vinh Long NP has been that of narcotics suppression. As the year ended, it appears that heroin traffic, which had been fairly substantial, has been stopped or at least drastically curtailed. Most recent violations have involved liquid opium and drug arrests have diminished to three or four a month compared to 20 to 30 heroin arrests per month early in 1972. On the other hand, criminal and subversive investigations are poorly conducted, thus there have been few results. A successful foot and vehicular patrol has been initiated in Vinh Long City. Rural patrolling has also been started but with less effectiveness.

Training of the police has been fairly thorough. Courses in management, reporting, anti-narcotics operations, criminal investigations and patrolling were all held at MR IV. Roll-call training has been established at all district and village headquarters and monthly seminars for Village Chiefs of police are held at Districts and at Province Headquarters for District Police Chiefs.

Facilities have been greatly improved in Vinh Long for the Police. Firearms arms ranges, Marine Police docking facility, Police Operations Centers, 14 village police stations, and improvements in Province detention center and penitentiary were all accomplished during 1972. Establishment of a Police Operations Center (POC) for the reception and screening of all information on subversive and criminal activities was completed during 1972. As experience is gained this center should improve police operations. The National Police strength is 2482 of 3719 authorized. The difference is due to lack of funds in the police budget rather than problems of recruiting.

A major scandal in the police department caused an investigation of the ID section during the year. Although the final report has not been released the Section Chief and several members of the section are being detained and will be prosecuted. At this time it is not known how many false ID cards were issued or how many were sold to illegal cadre.

In order to improve police operations increased training in all fields of operation and management is required. Just as important as training is the proper screening and selection of personnel for the police. Special programs require special talents and an improved screening system is needed to provide personnel with proper prerequisites. The general level of education of all police must be raised to improve the overall police image as well as their performance. As the military forces decrease in future years, added emphasis must be given to improving both the caliber and training of the police force.

PHUNG HOANG (POPAT).

The Phung Hoang program was terminated on 1 December 1972 with responsibility for elimination of the VCI transferred to the police. The new program was called "protection of the people against terrorism." The transfer of respon-

sibility was accomplished smoothly and efficiently but unfortunately with no major improvement in results.

Although the Phung ^hHoang Program was billed as one of top priority in the 1972 plan and received a great deal of lip emphasis at corps level meetings, it never received operational priority.

I had many discussions with the two Province Chiefs with whom I worked and never received a satisfactory explanation as to why the program was so unsuccessful. There is no doubt in my mind that the VCI are known and could be apprehended with little difficulty. Yet, when exceptional authority was given to Province Chiefs under the F6 program only very low level VCI were picked up and most of these were released for lack of evidence. The previous Province Chief told me that despite the apparent pressure from the Corps Commander to pick up the VCI, he received a phone call from the Ministry of Interior in Saigon telling him not to be exuberant and not to make any mistakes.

There have been sufficient rumors, innuendos and PSCG reports to convince me that high level cadre are protected. The fact that this is a society in which the family receives one's first loyalty explains to a degree why some VCI are not touched. With families split between the VC and GVN it is conceivable that highly placed GVN officials or those in key positions could effectively prevent apprehension of their relatives. Pay-off is probably another device for protection.

I have told the present Province Chief that while I accept family loyalty and old friend or school ties, I cannot understand how one can protect a person who is committed to the destruction of all that the GVN is or stands for. Friendship and loyalty should be a mutual affair. You cannot plan the destruction of the society and values of an individual and still be his friend. The machinery is there. If and when the GVN wants to eliminate the VCI I believe it can be done. Until that time dossiers will be filed and destroyed and rebuilt and the little men will be caught to become a statistic on a chart or in a report.

The following poem by the last Phung Hoang advisor on Team 68 may have as much truth as poetry.

THE DEATH OF PHUNG HOANG

When days were old and nights were bold
and VCI were not invented,
This mythical bird spoke only peaceful words
and it seemingly was contented.

Then came the war and they needed a claw
that would snatch and grab Lao Dong
They sent out a call to advisors and all,
and some idiot gave birth to Phung Hoang.

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The bird swooped down without flutter or frown
and began to kill, pillage, and burn.
But before it was done, before the fight was won,
its time had come to return.

And when like you old bird I too shall pass
amid the VCI dossiers scattered on the grass
May Zeus and Aphrodite both welcome us home.
For our return signals the death of Phung Hoang.

by O. P. ANDERSON, Major, MI
Final Phung Hoang Advisor
Vinh Long Province, RVN

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT

This was an excellent program and it has accomplished a great deal in the physical building of schools, bridges, etc. The Vinh Long program has, for the past two years, been a large one, possibly the largest in the country. In 1972, 420 projects have been funded at a total cost of 90 million piasters and 37,000 man days of donated labor. Sixty-three of these projects are large ones (category II), and eleven are inter-village projects. The program appears to have accomplished its purpose now. With 80% of the land tax to be retained at Village level in 1973, Villages should no longer need a subsidy from Saigon. VSD should be sharply curtailed and used only in those areas where Villages are too poor to support themselves.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT CADRE:

This is by far that best, highly motivated administrative group in province. The number of cadre has decreased throughout the year as the GVN prepares to take over the funding of the program. Compared to the 850 cadre the province had in early 1972, 712 are currently assigned, of which 606 work in 64 Village teams. A great many additional responsibilities have been added to their charter during the year, including total responsibility for the Village Self Development and People's Information programs as well as the village postal services. Care should be taken not to spread the RDC too thin as fewer cadre are given greater responsibilities. While a rise in the educational level of the cadre is needed to assure their continued success they are generally doing excellent work.

ETHNIC MINORITIES:

Cambodians from about 3% of the population of Vinh Long Province. Most of them are concentrated in three or four villages in the south-central part of the province. Though nearly all Cambodians are farmers, they have benefited little from the agriculture boom that has taken place in recent years, mainly

because of their unwillingness to adopt modern farming techniques. During the past year special courses have been held to teach Cambodian farmers to apply modern methods. Education has received increased emphasis in the Cambodian community, but much remains to be done since nearly 75% are illiterate.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

Politically, 1972 was a year of change. This has brought some confusion and regression at village and hamlet level as all elections were cancelled early in the year and a large number of positions eliminated in August by Decree 120. The latter action has had some positive result, with greater economy and the replacement of some incompetent village and hamlet chiefs.

The Province budget was self-sufficient in 1972 for the first time in anyone's memory. Vinh Long was one of seven provinces in Viet Nam targeted for this goal in 1972. Thanks largely to the new agricultural development fee and the export tax, the province collected 83 million piasters from local sources (no subsidies involved). Village budgets collected 173 million from local sources as compared to the 137 million originally budgeted. The new tax decree issued in December, 1972, should do a great deal to improve the village and province fiscal position, and in the process both improve the quality of local government and relieve the drain on the national budget.

AID IN KIND.

This was an exceptionally valuable program used to the maximum in Vinh Long. It was noted for its flexibility and high impact. Consideration might be given to semi-annual rather than quarterly funding (quota's) to eliminate pressures to spend within a short period of time.

During 1972, 9.4 million piasters (\$22,000 U.S.) were used on more than 100 local projects. In addition, five special grants totalling 4.2 million piasters (\$9,900 U.S.) were used for five major projects. During the year, AIK was generally withheld from simply augmenting normal GVN budgeted programs, and used to fund projects such as dams, schools and road-building/repair. In selecting these projects, the willingness of local people or the village officials to make contributions was carefully considered.

REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

WAR VICTIMS.

This program was a relatively minor one in Vinh Long as the province has largely been spared wide-scale war actions during the past months. In August approximately 150 families fled from Dinh Tuong (P) to Vinh Long's Cho Lach (D). Again in September some one thousand fled from war actions

in Kien Hoa (P) to Vinh Long's Vung Liem (D). In both instances these people lived with friends and relatives for a number of days or weeks until the situation in their home provinces stabilized and they were able to return. Vinh Long (P) was not able to help them, even with food allowances, as MSW policy required such displaced refugees to live in formal camps, which was neither desirable nor realistic in this circumstance.

During 1972, benefits were given to the following war victim's families due to war related actions within the province:

- a. Homes damaged under 50%: 97
- b. Homes damaged over 50%: 223
- c. Civilians killed: 143
- d. Civilians wounded: 125

SOCIAL WELFARE:

During 1972, the Social Welfare Service paid Return to Village benefits to 2,323 families. Of this number 1,086 families received reconstruction benefits, 394 received roofing benefits and 843 received both roofing and reconstruction benefits. The rice allowance benefit has never been paid in this province. In addition, as of January, 1973, all 740 RTV families registered in 1972 were paid full payments, but a backlog of nearly 8,000 families registered in 1970-71 still await partial benefits.

A total of 220 RTV construction projects, ranging from schools to small bridges, were begun in 1972. A large number of these are now completed. 72 classrooms and 11 MD's funded by MSW in 1971 were also completed during the year. Difficulties encountered include late appropriation of funds by Saigon and Province and inadequate supervision of construction at village level. Thought should be given to allowing the RD Cadre to supervise these projects as well as VSD projects.

The Social Welfare Service has continued to operate a low-cost restaurant for poor families, a day care center for 60 children and a number of training classes for unskilled war-veterans and poor people. 165 persons have completed 3-month training courses in electricity, metal working, vehicle engine repair and sewing.

The Ministry of Social Welfare is overly centralized and restrictive. It tries to control everything and consequently controls little. It gives no responsibility to its province technical service chiefs which results in unreasonable delays. When a totally itemized "Bau Diep" finally reaches Province level, after six months or more of waiting, the situation has changed, e.g. rains prevent construction. While I realize the program involves large

amounts of money and is open to corruption, I doubt if corruption is minimized through procedures now in use. The aim of the program is to help people when they are in difficulty. This is not being done. Much greater local control needs to be given at Province level if the program is to effectively accomplish its primary mission.

The Province Food for Peace program was restored in October, 1972, after a two year suspension. Over twenty institutions are currently participating in the program. The regulations, contacts and rationing procedures continue to make the program extremely difficult to administer fairly. Simplification of the rules and greater restrictions on the number of eligible institutions would improve the program.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Owing to the reduced number of Hoi Chanh, District and Province Chieu-Hoi Centers should be closed, with only one or two centers open for the whole Military Region. This would save a good deal of money on staffing, allow better political training (via better selected staff) at the regional centers and allow the valuable land and facilities to be turned over to province/district for use as hospitals, schools, or other need facilities. During 1971 there were 565 ralliers and in 1972, 321 ralliers. In January 1973, 18 rallied.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

REPORT REQUIREMENTS:

Particularly with the headquarters phase-down, the report requirements coupled with the need for OERs and PERs for phase-out and end-of-year requirements, have been extraordinarily heavy. The suspense dates given for 1973, CD-LD Plan updates of various kinds have been much too short. We are continually planning but the need to write out information in a particular format takes time.

Too many official statistics are required. A short comment would often be much more revealing and helpful in many cases. A need exists on many statcal reports for "actual" figures as well as "official" ones.

REPORT FEEDBACK.

On statistics, feedback has generally been good, if sometimes overwhelming. Statistical reports inidicate better or worse performance but no one knows why. In civil operations a need exists for better exchanges of information between Development officers of various provinces.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEALTH.

In 1972 the province was successful in opening eleven medical facilities that had been constructed in 1970 and 1971 but were without furniture or medical personnel. Most of these are located in remote villages and hamlets. Another seven facilities remain closed as of this writing but the contract for construction of furniture has been signed and medical personnel are trained.

A new director of public health, a fully certified doctor, came to Vinh Long in mid-year and has revitalized the public health service. The former director had responsibility for both the Province hospital and the Service-one job too many for anyone to do well. The new man, Dr. Anh, in addition to the normal functions of his service, has instituted a more rigorous inspection program for water supplies, ice houses and restaurants. A major educational seminar on Hansen's disease was organized for province medical personnel which has resulted in better appreciation of the disease, earlier detection of afflicted personnel and treatment for many more.

The Province Hospital has begun to formally deal with the narcotics problem; a five-bed ward for addicts attempting to "kick" the heroin habit was opened during the year and is being expanded with A.I.K. help. A rudimentary drug education program has also been started in some public high schools. Mass inoculations of school children for smallpox, polio and other diseases continues as the limited supplies of vaccines become more available. There were no major epidemic outbreaks during the year.

Medical supply remains a problem at all levels, but the logistics backlog will have to first be solved in Saigon.

Further building of maternities and dispensaries should be strongly discouraged. Such facilities in rural locations cost large amounts to build, staff, and maintain, and are used by few people on a daily basis. No such facility should be constructed in any village within 30 minutes from an existing health facility. Too many agencies, e.g. Province Council, Social Welfare, CPDC Saigon, and VSD, in the past built dispensaries without consulting the Vinh Long Public Health Service. Present health facilities should be improved, particularly those at district towns. A doctor should be available and should have adequate supplies and equipment. Each district should have a mobile health team for preventive medicine. These teams would travel to all villages and hamlets on a regular, well publicized basis. Such teams would be less expensive than permanent facilities, have greater medical knowledge, and be better supplied. Specialized personnel dealing with dentistry, water and sanitation could periodically accompany the teams.

EDUCATION.

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In elementary education, this province has annually been adding 10,000 students to the system for the past four years. While a small percentage of hamlets still have no school, every child who wants to go to elementary school now can do so for the first time in history. The approximate present elementary enrollment in grade -1-5 is 110,000 students. During 1972, 119 elementary class-rooms were finished that had been funded (from all sources) in 1971, and another 84 funded for 1972 are either finished or near completion.

In secondary education an average of 3,500 new students have been added for each of the past four years. There are large public high schools not only in the province and all district towns, but in several villages as well. Present high school enrollment numbers 28,200. Yet many thousands more wish to go who cannot -- the pressures on secondary education will be most pressing over the next five years. In high school classroom and began construction of 43 more, many of which are now completed. These are significant gains that have had great overcentralization at the Ministry of Education.

The Vinh Long Normal School has increased its enrollment slightly during the year and presently has 1,203 students in its two-year teacher training program. The two large technical schools in Vinh Long presently enroll 1,005 students. In both the Normal and Technical Schools, the present physical facilities would allow enrollment to be doubled if MOE directives and restrictions, as well as local administrative practices, could be changed.

The greatest single reform that would immensely improve the quality of elementary education, as well as having a significant positive affect on villages power relationships, would be to allow the present elected village councils to act as a board of education with the power to hire and fire teachers over a given contract period. The MOE and province should only determine general standards for teachers, prepare textbooks, offer training courses, and establish prerequisites for each grade level. Vocational, agricultural and teacher (training) education need greater emphasis. This might occur "naturally" if different sections of the MOE would talk to each other.

PUBLIC WORKS.

Major accomplishments in 1972 include the opening of the ferry service to Cho Lach (D) (destroyed during the 1968 TET attacks), the total rebuilding of Route 37 that runs through the southern portion of the province from Binh Minh (D) town to the Vinh Binh (F) border (one section of 101m remains unfinished at this writing due to rock transport difficulties), the final completion of Route 142 from the Sadec (P) border to Binh Minh (D) town, the resurfacing of Route 39 from LTL 70 to Huu Thanh (V), Tra On (D), replacement of two major bridges, and extensive repairs and additions to water lines,

8/ sewers, sidewalks and roads within Vinh Long City. Six of seven district towns have completed water purification plants but some remain inoperative until connections are made to individual homes. This is programmed for the near future.

The My-Thuan Bridge project, spoken of and studied for so long, remains in limbo as of this writing. Major finishing touches of National Route 4 and LTL 70 are programmed for 1973 as well as construction of a new bridge across the Mang-Thit canal on Hwy LTL 70.

Serious consideration should be given to restricting the Public Works Service to maintenance and repair of existing roads, and to the overuse of contracted projects. Private contractors should be used for new road construction. This will expedite the maintenance of existing roads, which is often neglected because Public Works is committed to extensive new projects. Irrigation and water control projects deserve much greater attention and funds. VSD money is slowly turning in this direction but will only be able to handle relatively small, local projects.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

The introduction of high yield varieties of rice and other modern farming techniques have revolutionized farming, while land reform has allowed the farmer to receive the benefits. Increased production has been accompanied by rising prices for farm products so the rural population is more prosperous than ever before. Elaborate homes owned by farmers are becoming commonplace, and farm machinery sales are booming.

Banking has flourished in the past year. In September 1971, there was only one bank in the province, the government owned Agricultural Development Bank. A rural bank, privately funded with government support, opened in September 1971. By April 1972, it had more money in deposits than any rural bank in Vietnam. In 1972, three private branch banks of Saigon institutions opened in Vinh Long City, a fourth will open soon. A second rural bank also opened in Binh Minh (D) in 1972 and by April 1973, the province plans to have rural banks operating in five of the seven districts of the province.

The expertise and contact are presently not available at province level to break out of the agriculture economy. This is a question of policy and contacts that are available only at the national level. The construction of the Vinh Long River port with pier and two large warehouses is largely completed. Saigon holds total authority, however, and the province has not yet been consulted as to how the port is to be actually used. Advisory contacts with the U.S. Joint Economic Committee, the Ministry of Commerce, USAID Logistics and Agriculture, and the Saigon Port Authority are beginning to force more definite plans for this major facility.

LAND REFORM.

Progress in Land Reform has been substantial with tenant farming nearly eliminated. The Land to the Tiller Program distributed more than 60,000 hectares of riceland to more than 52,000 former tenants over the past three years. In no other province of Vietnam have so many people benefited from the LTT law.

More control should be exercised over compensation payments to old landlords, where the potential for corruption is great. Greater attention also needs to be given to the reclamation of abandoned land, particularly through water control improvements.

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION.

Vinh Long now produces more miracle rice than any other province; a total of 78,000 crop hectares. More than 2/3 of the rice grown in the province is miracle rice; only one other province grows more than 50% miracle rice. While most farmers now use fertilizer, their reluctance to use it in recommended quantities is limiting production. Rice is still the principle agricultural commodity and crop diversification has not taken place as rapidly as it should. Since salt water intrusion is not a problem in Vinh Long, all of the land could be producing crops for 12 months a year. If the land was used continuously, production could triple or quadruple its present level. This would require a substantial investment in canals, dikes, dams and pumps; but the rate of return should be favorable.

LABOR.

In the past year the Labor Service, which serves both Vinh Long and Sadec, has completed its new office building. That building and a few vocational training classes are the only visible signs that the Labor Service exists. Current law and its small staff inhibit its activity. We have continually urged greater efforts in planning for the future to little avail.

YOUTH AFFAIRS.

The Vinh Long Community Center with a gym and swimming pool is constantly used by the youth in Vinh Long City. Provincial youth rallies have frequently been organized, and due to excellent facilities and physical location, Vinh Long has often been the location for Delta wide youth conferences and sports competitions. The first "junior olympics" of Vietnam was held in the province in late June. All of these have been well organized. The youth at village level are not as well organized, but efforts are being made to include them in youth activities. Youth leaders from most of the province's 65 villages received training during the year.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

Province officials are generally competent; over-centralization at the Saigon level, is the most serious inhibiting factor. Few decisions can be made or altered to fit local situations. Village and hamlet administration has suffered setbacks during the past year due to cancellation of elections, re-shuffles under Decree 120 and heaped-on responsibilities with little authority. Until the situation stabilizes, little additional progress can be expected even though a few villages have strong and capable officials.

Training of existing officials has progressed well, in spite of the aforementioned difficulties. The Province Training Center held courses involving 1886 officials during the year. In January, 1973, the competent Director of Training was transferred to the NIA in Saigon for further education. His departure will, of necessity, cause some disruption in training efforts.

The Local Revenue Improvement Program has been successful due to a patch-work quilt of new taxes. The province has achieved 100% fiscal self sufficiency for the first time in anyone's memory. The Villages are largely held back by Saigon's own restrictive requirements but the new tax decree promulgated in December, 1972, is a tremendous step in the right direction.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP.

The VIS-PSYOPS-POLWAR effort has been steady over the past year, rather than spectacular. The recent replacement of the VIS Chief may improve the information effort. The withdrawal of the VIS cadre from the village level early in the year had no unfavorable impact. RD Cadre, who took over the program, are doing superior work. The recent arrival of the Thu-Due cadets has given a general morale boost to province information/propaganda efforts. Throughout the year the requisite number of banners, flag paintings and loud-speaker broadcasts have been fulfilled. In the two months immediately preceding the cease-fire pressure from above, and better, more current, news did indicate the program could be effective, at least at Province city and District town levels.

Generally, the major difficulty with psyop is the slowness with which new directives come from Saigon. Little local initiative is allowed or encouraged and the content of printed instructions and materials is often weeks behind events. This greatly limits the effectiveness of propaganda. The lack of initiative on the part of the Polwar Commander and the failure of VIS, Polwar and RED Cadres to coordinate efforts or to be given positive direction has greatly limited their effectiveness. In those few instances where command emphasis has been applied and clear cut missions assigned, such as in clearing and resettlement operations, the Psyops effort has been very effective. Unfortunately, these occasions were all too rare.

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The solution would appear to be better training and education of Province and District leaders on the capabilities and best methods of employing the various Psyop/Information elements. Also encouraging Polwar/VIS leaders to use initiative and develop plans might increase their effective utilization. I have never seen the Polwar or VIC Chief included in a planning conference. If they were to work closer with the S3 and the Province Deputy for Administration, they would probably be able to offer advice on the best utilization of resources to support operations and program.

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